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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LA WRENCF.J W. BROWN,

Plai11tiff-Res pondent,
vs.

CHARLES FRED JOHNSON and
HOYAL BAKING COMPANY,
Def rndants-A ppellamts,

Case No.
11899

AP·PELLANTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Action hy plaintiff to recon'r damages for personal
inj11riPs snstainPd in an automobile accident.
Dl8POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Thl· .inr:'• rdnrned a verdict of no cause of action
in

tlw first trial. 'fhe court, J ndge Marcellus K. Snow

,:itting, g-rante<l plaintiff's motion for a new trial. In the
o;1·1·ond trial, the jury returnPd an Prroneous verdict in
court, Judge Leonard W.
favor ol' the plaintiff, which
Elton sitting, did not accept until reYised. Judgment was
ttPntly PntPrPd on tlw re\·ised verdict of thP second
.111r>- ancl tliP eonrt clPniPd defendant's motion for a new
trial.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEcAL
Defendants pray for reversal of the judgment entered by the trial court on the second jury veraict anJ foi
reinstatement of the judgment of no cause of action
entered on the first jury verdict; or in the alternative,
defendants pray that the case be remanded and the trial
court ordered to grant defendants a new trial with direction that the issue of damages relating to possible futme
surgery be eliminated from the jury's consideration.
STATE.MEN'!' OF FACTS
(The followin,r; statements of facts as to liability
from the first trial.)

111e

The collision out of which this action arises occmn·d
January 11, 1968. Plaintiff was driving a Corvair automobile down Emigration Canyon. The defendant.Johnson
was driving a step-van bread truck in the course of hio
employment with the defendant Ro)·al Baking
and had followed plaintiff's automobile for approxirnatt>ly
one mile down the canyon before the accident occmred
(R. 738). Mr. Johnson had plaintiff's automobile in \'iP\\
most of the time as both vehides were prnceeding dO\rn
the canyon (R. 739), but the plaintiff ne\·er saw the
bread truck at any time prior to the collision (R. 595).
As the vehicles entered a straight section of road \Ylier
passing was permitted (Exh. P-1), Mr..Johnson started
to pass plaintiff's automobile since there was no oncoming
traffic approaching (R. 596). 'fhen• was no intenwetio11.'
in the area, no automobiles ahead of plaintiff, or an.1·
other circumstance, according to plaintiff, which would
1
'
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J;a,·p indicated to anyone following the plaintiff that
i1t might suddenly decelerate (R. 596).

\flwn thP front of the bread truck was about even
w1tlt the rt>ar of plaintiff's automobile, plaintiff applied
his hrahs and sw<'rnd somewhat to the left (R. 740) .
.\Ir. .Johnson then dPcided not to complete his pass bernu:-:P he was afraid plaintiff might lose control of his
antornohile and skid into tlw bread truck (R. 785). As
li1· was gl'tting back into the right-hand lane, plaintiff
applied hi:s hrakPs the second tirrw (R. 740) without signnling, (R. 601), and apparently without observing to the
rear th rough his rear-view mirror (R. 595).
l 'laintiff's decPIPration was abrupt enough to raise
tlw rear Pnd of his automobile at least two and one-half
ineltPs in order that the rear hmnper of the Corvair could
c111t11· o\·er the front bumper of the bread truck (R. 702/0:l) and damage the right front fender of the truck
nL01·c the bumper (R. 741).

Plaintiff's d<.'cekration was made because of a small
1111µ; walking· along the right side of the roadway (R. 596)
\\l1i<'h nPYPr c-rossed tlw road or darted out in front of
l1i111 lwforP he applied his brakt>s (R. 598).
( Tlu· follo1ri11g statcn1e11t of fucts regardi11g the is·11

s of i11jury owl donl((qes ure from tlil' seco11d trial.)

As a n•snlt of tlH' areident, plaintiff ;,;ustained Yarion:-: injuriPs to hi:o-; nPck for whirh ht> was treated h:-· Dr.
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Thomas E. Soderberg. Plaintiff was also examined by
Dr. John N. Henrie four months after the accident at
the request of plaintiff's attorney (R. 434) and h>- Dr.
Reed S. Clegg seventeen months after the acodPnt
«n
independent medical examiner appointed by the <'onrt (Pt.
84-85). Dr. Henrie anticipated no l>Prmanent disabilii 1
as a result of the accident at the time of his examination
made four months after the accident (R. 440 & Exh. D-10)
and Dr. Clegg at the time of his examination made
seventeen months after the accident felt the healing
process had been completed (R. 468) and that plaintiff
could continue ·with his wrestling activities at the Uniwrsity of Utah, if he so desired (R. -±55).
The only testimony presentf:"d at trial n•gan!ing
whether or not plaintiff would requirP surgery in thr·
future as a result of the accident in question was that of
Dr. Soderberg when he testified that thPre was a cham·P
that surgery would be required, but it ·was not likely. HP
estimated that there was only about a 15% chance of
surgery becoming necessary at some later date (R. 368)
and, conversely, an 85% possibility that future surgery
would not be necessary (R. 394).
Defendants objected to the introduction of c>Yidrnc1•
relative to the surgical procedure, period of hospitalization and post operative care relative to a cervical fusion
operation, but said objection was overrnled (R. :369-371).
Defendants also requested by their requested jnry instruction No. 21 that the jury be instructed that
could not award damages for possible future surgery
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l'\]lPDsPs or disability resulting therefrom since there
no medical evidence admitted during the trial upon
whit •1 it could be found by a preponderance of the eviilf'lltl' tliat such surgery would become necessary, but
,;aid n·qnested instruction was refused (R. 211). Defend<1nts thereafter excepted to the court's failure to give defrndants requested instruction No. 21 (R. 499).
(The following statement of facts regarding jnry
ddiuerntio11s and t'erdicts is from the second trial.)

'l'he court specifically instrncted the jury that if they
found the issues of liability in favor of the plaintiff, the
amonnt of special damages awarded could not exceed
$J17.50 (R. 234). Neverthelt>ss, the jnry returnt>d a
wrdiet of spt>cial damages of $10,000.00 and general damHf!'('C: of $1,700.00 (R. 503-504), making a total verdict
of $11,700.00. The court declared the verdict erroneous
IR. ;)02 & ;)13) and sPnt the jnry ont to re-deliberate "·ith
thP additional instruction that they re-read the instrucpa:-·ing 1mrticular attention to the instructions regardinµ: damages (R. 508).
'J'lie .inr:-· rt>tired to re-deliberate at 4 :35 p.m. (R.
and rPturned tlwir second wrdict into the courtroom
at+ :4: l p.111. (R. 510). 'r11e second vt>rdict a"·arded special
rlama!!\'" of $377 50 and ho·pnpral dama<res
of $11 ' 322 • 50
b
IR. :112), making a total wrdict of $11.700.00, tlw sanw
1
< 111<nmt a,.; awarded h>· th• first verdict.
(l

•
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINT;FF
A NEW TRIAL.

Plaintiff's motion for a 1ww trial following th .. firc;1
trial was made solely upon the factual basis that the evidence did not support the verdict of no cause of action
returned in favor of defendants (R. 181). Plaintiff made
no claim of legal error in the admission or rejeetion of
evidence, in the giving of jury instructions, or in the ronduct of the court or counsel.
The factual issues tried 111 this case
1d1dl11·r
or not the defendant Johnson was
11
or not plaintiff was contributorily nPgligent and whdlu•r
or not the negligence of either was a proximate can;;e of
the accident. This court has
held that tlie
determination of negligence, contributory nPglig-pnc·p and
causation is the prerogatiYe of the jury. Si11glctoJ1 u.
Alexander, ct al., 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 12G (1%7)
and Corbridge vs. M. Morrin & Son, Inc., 19
409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967).
Defendants do not question the principl<> that 111otiom
for new trials are addressed to the sound discrPtion of
the trial court in order to preV('nt manif Pst
should it occur, but contend that such diseretion should
be exercised with restraint when the only g-roumls tlaiu1ed for a new trial is ''insufficiency of the PYiclencc·" on
issues which are traditionally the prerogative of the jm:
to determine. Certainly one who attacks a jun· verdirt
with a claim that it should be set aside and a 1ww trial
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:tnled should show some irregnlarity, indication nt'
•i·.iwliee or some other fact which may have prevented
tiw J1arti<'S from having a fair trial. Plaintiff alleges
110 -ud1 fact in his motion for a new trial and defendants
.. ontPnd that nonP is shm,-n in the record (R. 541-802).
'.'!

J)efrndants readily agrPe \\·itlt the principle set forth
rn ff.111ru/(l rs. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 421
/:)ii ( l9GI) that the trial judg<''s rok in overseeing
tli1· procPss of trial h:• jur:< with respect to ruling on motions for a new trial goes beyond merely determining
11lwtlwr or not the P\·idencP will or will not support tk,
wnlic-t, lint in th<'
of any other contention and
\I iil'r" tlt<' Pvidencl· is ratlwr
halanced on tlw is·s of 11PgligPnce and contributory negligence, as will
111· 1-d"ern·d to hPreaftt'r, tlw eourt's discretion to grant
:1 111·\\· trial should be exercised
cautiously. Indeed,
tl1 :-;tanclard as !:Wt forth in the Hyland case, supra,
c!1onl(l lw follo\n'd:
"( 'onsistPnt "·itlt tlH, pnrposP just discussed,
,,·]1('JH'nr \\hat has transpired in the proceeding
is so oHl'nsin' to tht• trial c-ourt's senSl' of jnstict'
tliat hl' 1H'li1'ws thP dPsired object of affording
tll<' part:es a fair trial has failed, he has hoth tlH'
pn·rng·ati\«' and the duty to grant a 1ww trial."
In th1' llylu!ld cas(', the plaintiff was seriously in.111r1·cl \\·Iii!(' lwing eathdNizPd hy an
of dPIPndant

l 11'pital. Tlic'l'P \\·as no <1nestion of contributon·
necrli.
b
on tlie ]Jart of tl11' plaintiff, tli(' dd'endant al!O\n'd
' I'<
nntrai1wcl J)('l"son to 1wrfonn a rather :::;ophist1'":lh·(l 1irnc·<'dm1', and tli<' orderly
. admitted inflatinO',..... the
l 111:11111 oi" tli·· eath<'tPr
ohtaininp: urine as he knP\\7

from instructions and previous experience should occ1.r
when the catheter entered the bladder, which shoni<l fo.k
place before the balloon was inflated. A verdict ot no
cause of action on such facts is without question againBt
the weight of the evidence and offensive to one's sen8e
of justice.
However, such is not the case in the present adion.
The jury could well have found the defendant J olmBon
acted as a reasonably prudent person in attempting to
get back into the right-hand lam• when he saw plniutiff's brake lights illuminate for some reason unknown
to him and was afraid the plaintiff might skid into l1i111
(R. 785). Like·wise, the jury could \Yell han fonnd tlll·
plaintiff contributorily negligent in failing to k<'('JI a
reasonable lookout to the rear and in snddPnly
his speed without giving a signal of his intention to do :-:o.
Although the canyon road was a winding road, the
defendant Johnson was able to see plaintiff's automobile
ahead of him most of the time as tlH'.V traveled do\\11 the
canyon toge•ther for approximately one mile hdol'P the
accident occurred (R. 739). The jury might Wl'li haw
found that if plaintiff had glanced into his rear Yirw
mirror ocasionally as he traversed that last milt> before
the accident occurred, that at least on one occasion he
would have seen defendant's bread truck and known that
it was in the vicinity.
plaintiff testified he m·1·er
saw the truck at any time prior to the accident (R. 595),
the jury may well have concluded that he did not look to
the rear as often as he should haw during that last mil».
This court has previously held it to be a jnr,v qu(';;tio11

8

rJ1<"tlt<·r or not a forward dri,·er is guilty of negligenc(·
. 'ailing to observP traffic approaching from the rear.
Hayr/!'11 rs. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P.2d 796
(19;):3).
Also, Section 41-6-69( c), U.C.A., 1953, provides that:
'"Ko person shall stop or suddenly decrease the
:-;pl'Pd of a ,·ehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in tlw manner provided herein to
the driwr of any vehicle immediat<:>ly to the rea1·
\l'hPn there is opportunity to give such signal."
Tlw trial court so instructed the jury (R. 152) and the
j11r:-· ('Ould have found that plaintiff had time to at least
flash !tis brake light:-; in adrnnC'f1 of his deceleration,
11lii<'li ]Ip admittedly did not do (R. GOl). The only signal
1:1· g·;m· was the illumination of his brake lights made
t·m1h·mporaneou:-;l>· \\·ith his dl'cPleration, which is not
an appropriatP signal of ont> 's intention to decelerate
'inC'.P it gin's no advanced warning of the contemplated
d1·et>l1·rntion. Unitcd States z:s. First Security Bank of
I 111!1.
4:24 (10th Cir.
a jnr>· or other trier of fact could realiave found to thP contrar>· on all of the fore.going
l'aet11al issues, hut since the verdict returned was in fayor
11
1' thP dl'f Pndanb, the d<:>frndants wPre entitlPd to have
tli 1• 1·,·idPm·p and
inf<:>rPnces which could logically
11
1 • drn\1 n tht>rdrom vit>\YPd in tlH· light most favorable
!11 thP111 h:· the trial eourt in eonsidering whether or not
1li ·n· 1rns an insuffiei<>nc·y of tlH· eyideneP to sustain
1 1
!1 • Hnh·t n•nd1Ted. In 8111itli rs. Gallegos, l(i Ftah 2d
-rno
;)70 ( 1!Hi;)) this Conrt reitPrated
prin'''tiiP in :-:ta ting:
1
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"It is elementary that where therl' is a <lio:p11t,

in the l'Yi<lence, resolving thP co11fliet:,; is r,1 1
the jury nn<ler its prProgatin' as tlw "xcl11c ,,,
finder of the faets. lt is equally so because of tl11·
,jnry's VPrdict in his favor,
must ae<'<']Jt tli1> l'i'
spondent J onPs' \"ersion of the l'ads and r<·Yi1·1.
the eyidl·neP and all inferenc<>s
to lH' dra\\11
thPrefrom in tlH' light most J'anJralill' to lii111.
Ha\·ing donP so, it ap1wars that tl1l'n' is a rearnll
ahlt> basis thPrein upon \d1ieh tlw jlll':· l'<mld r1·main nnpersnadPd that
rPspomll'llt .J mws fail<'d to pPrform his dnty in :·jpjding thP rigJtt Of
wa:·, as WP hav<' diseussecl ht>rl'in. A<'<'onlingl.1,
thl' trial eonrt \\·as \\'Pl! advised in n·j<·ding apjll'I
!ant's contPntion that rPspondPnt .JonPs ,:honk!
0
lw held ho-uiltY• of <'Ontrihnton·
npo·li
•
h
h ·l'n<·<· a,- a
rnattPr of law and
1m·sc•nt<'d thl'
to tl1(' jnry for ddPnnination."
t'vidPnce Yil'\\·Pd in the liglit

f'ayoral1!1· to

tlw ddendants is substantial and snffi<'il'llt to ;.:11"tarn
the \·erdict of no causP of adion and sin('(' laek ol' surt'iwas tlH' only gronnd clairnt>d h» tit(' plaintiff in
}1is motion for a nPw trial, thP trial

('Olll't

ahusl'd its lliscl"'

tion in sPtting asidl\ tlH' wrdiet and granting" 11l'\\. trinl.
'l'lw propt>r rnlP with l'<'SJH'<'t to how adiYl' a trial jt11lg1·
shonld ht>comP in sPtting aside YPrdids and grant 111g
JH'W trials is '""" statt>d h:-· .Justie<' Crn<'kdt in his c1111<·urring opinion in l lollll I'S I"S. Xcl.w!ll, 7 r ta h :!d

P.2d 722 (19fi8) as follows:

"rrhe \"Pnlid, wh<'ll supportPd l1:-- s1tllsta11tinl
evidence, should lw n'gardl'd as Jll'l's\1111ptinl"'
eonect and should not IH' int\'rft>rn·d \1·ith 11wn 11

hPcansp thP jndgl' might disap,-l'l'<' "·ith tll<'
'T'lw JH'ProgatiY<' sl1onld onl:-· h<' <'XPl'<'i:'<'d "ll<'n,
in vie\\· of thP trial <'Onrt, it S<'<'tlls ell'ar tlint tl!I'
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j11n· has misappliPd or failed to talrn into accollnt
11rnvPn facts; or mistmd<'n..;tood or disregarded
thP law; or mad.- findings el early against tht·
weigl1t of tl1<' p\·idenc<· so that the verdict i:-; ofJ'ensiYe to his sl'nsp of justice to the extent that
Ii<> eannot in good C'onscienC'<' permit it to stand."
Tl1i:-; ml(• \\·a:-; lakr adoptt-d h;; the (•ntin• court in the case
of H'1'1!111011 rs. Xo/Jlc, 12 l'tah :2d '.)30, '.)(j(j P.:Zd 701
"·l1<·rPin tlw eonrt stat<-d with res1>ect to the grant-

inµ:

or new trials 'dwn tlwre has been substantial evidence

i11trocl11<'\-'d "·hi<'h would sup1>ort the verdict:

''Such action is warranted only when to the trial
jndgl', it s<·1·ms elear that tl1<' jur:,r has misappliPd
or fai kd to take into aecount pron•n facts; or
mis11rnll·rstood or disn·gankd the law; or mach.•
findings c·l<•arl,\· against the \\'Pight of the eYidPne<'. .,
:\1·\\· trials

\\'('!'<'

granted in both tlw J!ol111rs and

ff, 111111111 (·asps; hut in tlw Holmes case, plaintiff "·as a
till'('(' and one-lialf .\·Par ol<l ehild (too :';oung to he contrilllltoril,\· negligent) who ran into tht• street and was
h,\' dPfrndant aft<•r the> latt<•r had h<·Pn 'rnrm·d by
wil'P of tliP <'hild's pn•sPnce "·hen h<' 'ms '.300 feet
frolll th<· point of impact and in tlw fVel111w11 casP, the
plaintiff

'rn" :-;itting in an
:-;topped lwhind a
trn('k and hon;;<· tra ilPr wlj('n struck h,\· dt>fend-

ant. wlti('l1 a<'eonling to :-;ome <'\·idPn<'<', dl'f Pndant should
kn·1· :-Pen i'or a eo11:-;id<·rahl1• <fo.:tanee prior to impaet.

111 tit<' in:-;tant C'a:-;<', tlwre was no disputP in the facts
1q11111 wl1ieh ddt>ndant:-; elairnPd plaintiff 'nl:-; contrihn111\ il.1 11!'.!.,dig(•Jlt :-;iJH'<' plaintiff adn1itt<'d not sePing ell'-
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court to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial.

*

*

*

''Consistent with that viewpoint, when the parties
have had the opportunity of presenting their
evidence and arguments concerning their disputes
to the jury, the judgment of the jury should he
allowed to swing through a wide arc within the
limits of how reasonable minds might see the
situation; and thP conrt should not upset a verdict
mert>ly ht>cans<' it may disagree. If it did so,
the right of trial by jury would he effectivt>ly
abrogated and the trial may as ·well he to tlH'
conrt in tlw first place."

In the instant casP, thert> is no claim that passion or
pn·judieP inf! llPlWPd tllP \'Prdict and tlwre is no indication that tht> jury aekd under a misconception of proven
fact:-; or misapplied or disregarded the law. To the conit appears that the jury ma.\' ha\·e believed the
rlvfrndant .Johnson acted as a reasonable man in pulling
linek hPhind plaintiff's automohille after plaintiff applied
l1is brakes tht> first time, or it may have found the plaintiff fail<>d to ht>p a reasonable lookout to the rear and
tliat if he had done so, he would have seen the defendant':-; lir<'ad truck and con,.:etiuently not have attempted
to stop sudden].\· when it was atempting to pass. Rather
than hm·ing disregarded the law, it appears only that the
jnn may have applit>d the law of contributory negligence
to tlH; eonduet of the plaintiff.
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fendant's truck at any time prwr to the accident when
it was obviously traveling behind him for a distar.··
of at least one mile. Therefore, in that n>gard. tlw ju1
could not have misinterpreted or misapplied the fac!f
The court instructed the jur)· regarding a forward <lri\
er's dnty to keep a reasonable lookont to the rear and((,
give an appropriate signal of his intention to 8top or
suddenly decn'asc his speed if there "·as an opportunih
to do so. Since the jnry apparently applied this la\\,
how can it he said that it misunderstood or disregarded
the law? While recognizing that it is difficult to prove
a negative, defendants most seriously contend that a
reading of tlw trial transcript of the first trial will not
off Pnd anyorn"s s0nse of jnstice that a verdict was rrndered in favor of tlw dPfendants, although they i11ay not
agree with it.
In Efco Distri/Juting, Jue. ·cs. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 3'i:i.
412 P.2d G15 (196G) this court affirmed the trial conrt'>
refusal to grant a ne·w trial where the jm)· foLmd tht
issnes in favor of the plaintiff bnt awarded no damage·>.
It stated the rnle \Yhich shonld gon·rn trial conrts in
a\rnrding a new trial as follows:
"If it clearly appears that there has been a mis·
carriage of justice hecanse the jury has refused to
accept credible, nncontradicte<l P\·idPncP "·Jipn
tlwre is no rational hasis for rejecting it, or it i>
plain to he sPPn that the ,jun· has aeted nnder a
misconception of 1iroven faets, or has misapplied
or disregarded tl1e law, 01· \\·lwrP it appears that
tlw V<'rdict \ms the nsnlt of 1iassion and prjndiee.
it is hoth tl1P pre1·ogatin and tliP dnty of tlll'
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO E;STl\L·r'
THE JURY THAT NO DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED M
COMPENSATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE SURGERY.

During thP Pxamination of Dr. Soderberg, plaintiff',
eoimsel ask<'d th<• doetor to dPsnilw how a n1ptured di;r
is repaired.

Ddt•ndants ohj<'dt>d nnlPss a fonndatir111

was laid that snrgery "·as contPrnplat(•d for thP plaintilt

(R. :3G:.?). ThP C'omt owrrnlPd thP ohjeetion (R :Hi:;!
and Dr. SoderliPrg d(•:-wribed in so11H' detail 110\Y an in
cision is made in the front of the m•ek, ho\\" tlH· :-:piw
is opPnPd up, ho\\" th<' disc material is re1110v<'d and
finall.'· how bonP is tlH·n taken from tl1<• Jlt>h·ic horn· anil
placed lwhn'Pn two of tlH=' intt•rnt<'hral ho<liPs of tlit·
spine (R. 3G:1). Lakr Dr. SodPrlwrg \\·as [ls]ml if lH· liad
an opinion as to whdliPr or Hot snrgcr:-· would lH' nqnired for tlw plaintiff,

to

which he replit>d:

"l think tht>n• i :-: a eliancr• that snrg<·r» ,,-i 11 lw
rn·cpssar)·, hnt it is not lihl:-·.

Q. How \\"Otild .'·on r·liaradt>riz<· tJiat cliarn l':
('an :.-ou ascrilw a pen·<•ntage to it?
A.

Yes. f think Larr.'· lias ahout a l;J';>c chanl'e
o requiring snrg<·r.'·· 'l1 !1is is what \\"<:' liave found
on tht> hasis of studit>s of follo\Ying p<'ople \ritl1
similar injnriP:-; ov»r a long p<·riod of time. Fil't"<'n p<·n·ent will PY<='ntuall.'· n•qnin· snrµ:nr.
(R. 368).
On cross (':\:alllination, Dr.
that tlH·

('Olff<'l'S(' \\"HS

n·adil:· ad!llill1·d

t 1"1H', i.(•., tliat tlH·re \\·as (.\]]

('lianee tlmt s11rg<·r:· \\·ould J1ot l1r• lH'l'<':'"ar:· for tlH· plain-

flf (R. iN±).
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Plaintiff's counsel then asked what would be required
iiy \1ay of hospitalization if surgery was required (R.
:169). ])ef endants again objected to the question since
there had been no medical evidence introduced by which
the jury could have found by a preponderance of the evirle1irr that any surgery would be required for the plaintiff, but the objection was overruled (R. 370) and the
1lodor was allowed to state that if surgery was required,
plaintiff would be hospitalized for a week to ten days and
\rnnld hP n·qnired to wear a neck brace for a veriod of
from six wet>ks to three months (R. 370).
"\ t thP conelusion of the evidence, defendants re-

LJlll'>"lPd that the jnry bi> instructed that they could not
a\\"anl damages in rnmpensation for any possible future
(R 211) but said instruction was refused and a
JH11p<·r Pxception was taken hy defendants (R 499).
Thi::; eomt revi('\\·pd a very similar ln·oblem in oore
''· /Je11ccr & Rio Grande lVesfrrn Railu:a.y Company,
-± l"tah 2d 255, 29:2 J>.2d 849 (195G). ln that case, there
was 1nedical <'Vidence of JWl"\"P root irritation which was
eonsistPnt with the Pxistenee of a disc injnry, but the
lliPclieal (•vid<·nce indieated nothing more than that tlwre
1rns a
tlw plaintiff suffered from a disc
injnr:i·, sinee this eonrt on re\·ipw observed:
"Although thP nwdical testimony indicated that
tlw
showPd a npn·e irritation, and that
:-:11eh
were consistPnt with the (•xistence
of th<' disc injury, WP cannot discover in the witness(•s' words nothing morP than their corollary
that, under thP ciremnstanees, a disc mJnry was
not i111possihle."
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,·ration the issue of possible future surgery (R. 154).
,
same instruction should have been given in the
,,ec(in<l trial; and since it was not, the court should have
,.,O'ranted defendant's motion for a new trial after the jury
rl'turned a verdict which strongly indicated it had awarded general damages for pain and suffering associated
with possible future surgery.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE
.JURY'S REVISED VERDICT IN THE SECOND TRIAL.

The first nrdict returned in the second trial was
l'learl,\' erroneous since it awarded special damages of
$10,000 (R. 255-A) "·hen according to the court's instructions, special damages could not exceed $377.50 (R. 234).
TIH· comt sent the jury out again to re-deliberate (R.
.iOS). :Such action was pennissible under Rule 47 ( r),
U.R.C.P., and Jorgenson vs. Gonzalloes, 14 Utah 2d 330,
:;1.n P.2d 934 (1963). Howe\·er, the jury did not re1/elilwratl', but merely made a mathematical calculation
as to add to gem•ral damages the amount they eould
not properly include in special damages. The jury retired
thP seeond time at 4 :35 p.m. (R. 508) and returned into
"omt at 4 :41 p.m. (R. 510). Since it always takes two
or three minutes to }ffOperly assemble the court personllP], counsel and the parties aftt>r the jury has infonned
the hailiff they are ready to return, the jury could have
nPf·n in session only three or four minutes at most and
nhvionsly did nothing more than make a mathematical'
!':dl'ulation to revise the verdict.
17

In the case at bar, there "·as less than the llH'l"
"corollary" that under the circumstancss future surgPn
was not impossible. Then• was an 85)'( prnhab1l1ty titat n
would not be necessary. As stated in the Moore case,
the total evidence introduced must tend to show a proba
hility upon which damages may be awarded as opposed
to mere conjecture. In the instant case, Dr. Soderberg's
opinion that there was a 15% chance the plaintiff would
require future surgery was apparently based
upon
the generaliz<'<l obsenation of prior studies of peop]('
with similar injnries (R. 368). As to whether or not
plaintiff would fall into the category requiring fntun
surgery is pure conjecture. In fact, the conjecture \I'll>
that there is an 85% chance he \Yill not.
In the Moore ea::w, it was held error not to han
withdrawn all consideration of a ruptured disc from tlir
jury. ·whereas in the instant case, defendants requested
only that the jury he instructed that it could not award
damages as compensation for the expenses or disability
associated with possible future surgery. As in the Moore
ea::;e, there is a strong indication that the jury mrnrdP<l
damages for the consequences of future pain and suffering
associated with cervical fusion operation, since theY
a\rnrdPd general damages of $11,:122.50 (R. :255-A), which
would hP an unusually high m\·ard of gen<>ral damagP>
when ::;pecial damages amonnted to only $377.50 and no
sllrg<>ry had heen pt>rfornwd to datt•.
Upon tlw ::;amp me<lieal eYi<lencP n•ceiyed in th<· first
trial ( R. 62:5-63'.2), the trial eonrt gave defendant nq1wst<'fl
instrllction taking from th<>
('Onsid16

The fact that the judy did not re-deliberate as
instructed (R. 508), as evidenced by its return ,,·iH1ii1
six minutes, is evidence of misconduct and
in refusing to follow the court's instrutions. In Fcrn1 __ ,;
vs. City of Pitt::-;lrnrgh, 145 A.2d 70G (Penn. 1958), aft("!'
one hour and 40 minutes of deliberation, the jury n·turneJ
a verdict of $15,000 plu:-; medical e-xpenses and "all conrt
cost:-; and attorne:;'s ft'es.'' 'l'lte trial judge irn.;trnded
the jur)· that the>· could not includ(' in their wrdict attorney's fees and court costs. The jury thereupon retired and five minutes latt>r returned a verdict of $25,0IJIJ
again:-;t tlw defendants. On appeal, the Pmnsylrnnia
Court ltPld:
"The jur:,':-; verdict, fi1·c mi111tfes {([fer_. of $:.!:i,OfllJ
1rn:-; a paknt method of adding
ft•1·'
and conrt costs b>· indin·ction and was
capricious, PXC<'ssiv<' and nnjnstifiahle." (E11q1!1nsis supplied hy court).
ThP
juggling of amounts lH'tween special and
general damage::; as a snh::;titute for n•-dt>lilwration l1as
also been held to constitute misconduct of the jury. In
Hall rs. Cornett, 240 P.2d 231 (On•. 197il), tlw
fin;t v<:•rdict for the plaintiff was in the :-;nm of $1,0(Hi.-tU
special damag<'s and $1.00 genpral damages. The trial
court cmrnickred the $1.00 general damag\'s award a'
inadequate under tl1<' circrnn:-;tane1·s and se11t the jm:
lmck ont to re-delihPrate. T!te jnry thPn n•turned a s1·c01Hl
wrdict of $:300.00 gern·ral damagPs and $707.40 s1 H'eial
damages, reaehing t!H' same total amount. 'L'he trial
eonrt set m;idP
sP<·ond \'Ndict and grnntecl H m·11
trial.
such action on a]JJJ<'al, tl1e {)rpg1 1n
Nnpreme Court held:
1
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"\Ve turn to the St'cond assignment of error which
relates to
st>tting aside the second wrdict and
µ;ranting a new trial. In returning that verdict,
tlH' jury was guilty of misconduct. The record
(•ondnsin,ly shows that they merely juggled the
fih'lll'PS whieh they had adopted in their first abortive verdict."
'l'hat is exactly what was done in the incident case,
the jury m(•rcly deducted $9,622.50 from the special
damages award of the first verdict and added it to the
:H,100.00 general damages award, making a general
damag·es award of $11,322.50 in the second verdict. The
total award of $11, 700.00 in the second verdict is the
-;ame total sum awarded in the first verdict. Consequent!;·. it i" clear there was no re-deliberation as ordered by
the l'onrt hut merely a mathematical juggling of the first
n·rdid.
Rimilarly, rn Fla11sberg rs. Paulson, 399 P.2d 356
(UrP. 196-1) it was held to be grounds for a mistrial whPn· the jnr:< was returned to correct an erroneous
,·,·rdi('t which awarded only special damages and the
:>econd Vt'l'dict Illt'l'Ply transferred all the SlH'Cials to
t!Yrn·ral darnaµ;Ps. The eonrt eonsidt>red this a "stubhorn
afilwn•nee to an invalid verdict'' and the refusal to follow
thP trial court's instnwtions was grounds for a mistrial.
Abo, the increase in the general damage figure was
l'il'n rly exeessi ,.e in view of the original general damage
figme. Plaintiff attempted to justify the increase in the
:.;t·nPrul damage award by submitting affidavits of jurors
to the ronrt in adYanee of the hearing of def end ant's moti1111 for a 11ew trial which preyentecl the court ruling upon
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their admissibility before they were made part of thr
record of this action. (R. 261-266). Such procedure was
highly improper and may have been prejudicial to tbe
defendant's position in their motion for a new trial. The
principle prohibiting such conduct and procedure is set
forth in Wheat vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Comparny, 120 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952) as
follows:
"The rnle prohibiting jurors from impeaching
their verdict is founded on sound reasoning and
has long been recognized. In People v1;. Flynn,
we said:

'It is well Sl;ttled that affidavits of juron
will not be received to impeach or question
their verdict, nor to show the grounds upon
which it was rendered, nor to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, nor that they
misunderstood the charge of the court, or the
effect of their verdict, nor their opiniom.
surmises, and processes of reasoning in arriYing at a wrdict.'

The policy behind this statement applies ,\·ith
Pqnal cogency to the oral e\·idence of jurors proffered u1)0n a hearing of a motion for a new triaL
To permit litigants to get ;jurors to sign affidavit'
or testify to matters discussed in connection with
tli<'ir funetions as jurors 'rnnld open the door to
inquin· into all matter of things which a losing
litigant might consider improper: misconceptions
of evidrnce or law, offers of settlement, personal
experiences, prejn<lice against litigants or their
causes or the classes to which the,· helong. It
would he an intPnninable and totally impradiea1
process. Such post-mortems would hP prodnrtiw
of no end of mischief and render service as a
juror unbearable."
20

CONCLUSION
'l'he verdict of no cause of action returned in the first
tri. 1 was supported by substantial evidence and nothing

appPars in the record to indicate that the jury either disregardt>d uncontroverted evidence or misapplied the law
so as to cause a misearriage of justice; and in the absencP of such a showing, it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to set the nrdict aside and award a new
trial.
Defendants were prejudice in the st>cond trial in the
following particulars: (l) by the court allowing the jury
to consider as an elenwnt of damages the consequences
of possible futnre surg<'ry when no medical testimony had
been introduced from whi<'h the jury could have found
by a preponderance of tlw evidence that future surgery
\\'onld be necessary, (2) by the jury's failure to abide
hy the court's instrnctions in awarding special damages
in it;; first wrdict, (3) by the misconduct of the jury
in failing to re-deliberate and merely juggling amounts
hetwet>n special damagt>s and gent>ral damages in returning its second verdict, and (-!:) by the misconduct of opposing coumwl in filing affidavits of jurors in the record
hefore the admissibility of such could be ruled upon by
the trial court at the hearing of defendants' motion for
a nPw trial.
WHEREFORE, appellants and defendants below
pray that the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff be reversed and that the judgment of no cause
of action Pntered on the first jury verdict be reinstated;
21

or in the alternative, that defendants be awarded a new
trial in the consequence of the prejudicial :>rro1 -:0Jt1- ,
I
mitted in the second trial.
Respectfully submitted,

HANSON & BALDWIN
H. Vvayne Wadsworth
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Appellants
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